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Abstract: A 57-year old man presenting with frequent and painful urination and negative initial urinalysis for infection 
was given a diagnosis of benign prostate hypertrophy, which was never revised by subsequent providers. Instead, the 
patient continued to be treated for urinary retention and pain. A potent NSAID, Toradol (ketorolac), was included in his 
regimen. One day prior to his demise, the patient was diagnosed with prostatic abscess and admitted for treatment with 
intravenous antibiotics. However the patient died on hospital day one from massive GI bleeding. Autopsy revealed an 
underlying peptic ulcer. 
This case shines a light on diagnostic error: missed, wrong, or delayed diagnosis. It also uncovers the multifaceted nature 
of diagnostic errors and highlights the importance of system- related interventions, in particular, better communication 
between health care providers. Based on malpractice claims data, diagnostic error is the most frequent and costly of all 
medical mistakes, yet it remains one of the least studied areas of patient safety. While the field has some barriers to study, 
many opportunities exist for impact in the field of diagnostic errors. 
Keywords: Diagnostic error, diagnostic process, delayed diagnosis. 
CASE PRESENTATION 
 A 57-year old man presented to the emergency 
department complaining of frequent and painful urination 
over the past three days. His past medical history was 
notable for benign prostatic hypertrophy, post-traumatic 
stress disorder, and chronic low back pain. His list of 
medications included fluoxetine, trazodone, aspirin 81 mg, 
and tramadol as needed for pain. 
 In the emergency department, urinalysis was negative for 
white blood cells, red blood cells, and leukocyte esterase. A 
Foley catheter was inserted with return of 200 cc of dark 
urine. Terazosin 2 mg orally daily was prescribed. The 
patient was advised to follow-up in urology clinic with his 
Foley catheter. 
 Three days later, the patient called his primary care 
physician complaining of increased pain since the Foley 
catheter had been inserted. Over the phone, his primary care 
physician asked the patient to increase the terazosin dose to 4 
mg daily. 
 Two days later (five days after initial presentation), the 
patient called his primary care physician again complaining 
of pain. He was advised to increase terazosin to 6 mg daily 
and Percocet was prescribed for pain as needed. Since it 
appeared that his Foley catheter was exacerbating his pain, 
the patient was advised to come to the clinic to see a nurse 
for catheter removal that day, which he did. 
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 The patient presented to the emergency department two 
days later with suprapubic pain and inability to pass urine 
since his Foley catheter had been removed. An emergency 
department physician re-inserted a Foley catheter with return 
of 1200 cc of urine. For pain, the patient was given ketorolac 
60 mg by intramuscular injection. The patient was advised to 
continue taking terazosin 6mg and to see his primary care 
physician the next day. 
 Two days later (nine days after initial presentation), the 
patient called his primary care physician. Now, in addition to 
the urinary symptoms, he also complained of back pain 
which prevented him from sleeping. His primary care 
physician increased his Percocet dose and ordered ketorolac 
6o mg IM injection to be administered in clinic. The nurse 
who administered the injection gave him the phone number 
for the urology clinic so he could schedule a follow-up 
appointment. 
 After another two days, the patient called his primary 
care physician again complaining of worsened back pain, 
suprapubic pain, and burning penile pain. This time, his 
primary care physician asked the patient to come to see him 
the same day, but the patient declined since his follow-up 
appointment with urology was in 3 days. His primary care 
physician then recommended him to increase his terazosin 
dose to 10 mg daily. He also ordered a lumbar spine MRI 
and added MS Contin 30 mg twice a day for better pain 
control. 
 Fourteen days since the beginning of his symptoms, the 
patient came to his scheduled urology clinic appointment 
complaining of severe abdominal pain and feeling very ill. 
Per urology note, the patient denied catheter problems. The 
urologist, however, did mention that the patient had 
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significant urinary retention and might need a TURP for 
symptomatic relief. Also in the note: “No apparent urologic 
dysfunction at this time (catheter draining well).” There was 
no documentation of a digital rectal examination (DRE) 
being performed. The patient was then referred to the 
emergency department to be evaluated for his diffuse 
abdominal pain. 
 Later that same day in the emergency department, the 
patient complained of the “worst pain imaginable.” He was 
given ketorolac 60 mg IM for pain. His temperature was 100 
F. A general surgery consultation was requested. Per their 
evaluation, there were no signs of an acute abdomen. White 
blood cell count was 20,000. Hemoglobin was 8.9 g/dl 
(baseline 13.9g/dl). A CT of the abdomen and pelvis was 
performed which showed an abscess in the prostate gland. 
The patient was admitted to internal medicine for treatment 
with IV antibiotics for prostatic abscess. 
 About 6 hours after admission, the patient complained to 
his nurse of not feeling well and being nauseated. Several 
minutes later, the patient became lethargic, clammy, and 
poorly responsive. A Code Blue was called. Patient expired 
in spite of resuscitation efforts. With family permission, an 
autopsy was done. Diagnosis on autopsy: Massive upper GI 
bleeding from 3 cm gastric ulcer. A Large prostatic abscess. 
THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
 What physician has not made a diagnostic error? The vast 
majority of diagnostic errors do not result in patient harm; 
however, some diagnostic errors have potential for causing 
patient harm, substantial suffering, and even patient death. 
Psychosis may turn out to be missed thyroid storm, which if 
left untreated, can lead to death. Assigning a benign 
diagnosis to a patient with abdominal pain may result in 
delayed diagnosis of ischemic bowel necessitating bowel 
resection. This is why diagnostic error is one of the most 
costly of all medical mistakes [1], and poses a continuous 
threat to patient safety. Besides causing direct patient harm, 
diagnostic errors carry additional risks due to unnecessary or 
delayed tests, treatments and/or procedures, not to mention 
an increase in healthcare costs. Yet, diagnostic errors still 
remain one of the least studied and most neglected areas of 
patient safety [2, 3].
 
 There are many reasons why diagnostic errors get short 
shrift. Clinicians may be resigned to making diagnostic 
errors, placing heavy stock in the adage, “To err is human.” 
Diagnostic error reporting systems are underdeveloped; in 
general, only those diagnostic errors that result in patient 
harm are captured. Experts believe that healthcare 
organizations have failed to view diagnostic error as a 
systems problem, and physicians responsible for making 
medical decisions seldom perceive their own rates as 
problematic [2]. However, data from malpractice claims 
indicate that diagnostic errors are one of the top reasons for 
such claims. In a study of paid malpractice claims which 
used data from the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), 
the most common types of adverse events in the outpatient 
setting were classified as diagnostic. In the inpatient setting, 
the second most common adverse events were also classified 
as diagnostic, only behind those classified as surgical [1]. 
The rate of diagnostic errors from autopsy studies is variable 
(4.9-49%), the median major error rate being 23.5%
 
[4, 5]. 
Since autopsy rates have plummeted over the past decade, 
autopsy data has become an insufficient source of 
information for determining diagnostic error prevalence. The 
exact diagnostic error rate is not known, but based on 
available data, it is estimated that the prevalence of 
diagnostic errors in clinical medicine is likely to be in the 
range of 5-15% [6, 7]. 
SOURCES OF DIAGNOSTIC ERROR 
 The process of making a diagnosis is complex and 
includes multiple interactions between patient, provider and 
healthcare system. The complexity of this process provides 
numerous opportunities for failure. Root causes of diagnostic 
errors can be broadly categorized as patient-related, system-
related and provider-related cognitive
 
factors, but the 
majority of diagnostic errors result from interactions of 
provider-related and systems factors [7, 8]. Patient -related 
factors play a lesser role, although patients with rare diseases 
or those with diseases presenting atypically may have 
delayed diagnosis and excessive diagnostic testing. A 
systematic review of diagnostic error in primary care 
revealed that common conditions such as malignancies, 
myocardial infarction, meningitis, dementia, iron deficiency 
anemia, asthma, tremor in the elderly and HIV are easily 
missed [9]. Another study found that the most common 
pathway leading to diagnostic error was the assignment of a 
common, benign diagnosis to a patient with uncommon 
serious disease [10]. 
 Over the past decade, it has become evident that most 
diagnostic errors arise from two domains: provider-related 
and system-related. Most frequently, a provider-related 
diagnostic error is the result of insufficient cognitive 
reasoning. Lack of medical knowledge remains less 
common, even when medical trainees are involved [7]. 
 In the diagnostic process, physicians use either intuitive 
reasoning (system 1) or analytic reasoning (system 2), so 
called dual process reasoning [11]. For the diagnostic 
process based on intuitive reasoning, both broad medical 
knowledge and vast clinical experience are essential. Those 
physicians who have seen certain medical conditions over 
and over easily recognize those conditions on subsequent 
encounters by pattern recognition. When faced with a 
middle-aged man presenting with voiding difficulties, a 
likely diagnosis of benign prostatic hypertrophy emerges 
from our subconscious since the pattern of presentation 
matches previous patient presentations. This type of 
cognitive processing has been commonly used in medicine 
because it is fast and usually effective. However, this type of 
reasoning is prone to cognitive biases, even in physicians 
with vast clinical experience. What if a patient presenting 
with urinary symptoms has prostatitis or prostate abscess or 
prostate cancer instead? Premature closure of the case and 
not considering a broader differential diagnosis, is one of the 
most frequent thinking traps. In a study which analyzed 583 
cases of diagnostic errors reported by physicians, failure or 
delay in considering the diagnosis was the most common 
failure in the diagnostic process [12]. Another frequent 
cognitive bias is attribution bias, where physician decisions 
are influenced by certain social stereotypes or other patient 
characteristics, leading physicians to the wrong diagnosis. In 
a patient with history of alcohol abuse who presents with 
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abdominal pain and elevated liver-associated enzymes, short 
cut thinking attributes those changes to alcoholic liver 
disease. However if a broader differential diagnosis is not 
considered, a potentially serious condition can be missed, 
such as acute cholangitis. It is not uncommon for physicians 
to remember “unusual cases” or patients with adverse 
outcomes for years after these events. Familiarity with 
certain groups of diseases may sway physicians to suspect 
the same disease when encountering patients with similar 
presentations. Again, it is true that many middle-aged men 
who present with voiding difficulties have benign prostate 
hypertrophy. The diagnosis appears most logical. However 
this availability bias can lead to premature closure of the 
case, with the potential of missing more serious conditions. 
Physicians should be aware of another cognitive trap known 
as anchoring, or focusing only on one set of information and 
ignoring others. In our case, additional information was 
available, but it was misinterpreted and ignored: worsening 
of back pain despite escalating doses of narcotics, was 
misinterpreted as “chronic back pain.” Ignoring or 
minimizing new or contradictory information to the 
presumed clinical picture is also known as confirmation bias. 
 Analytic reasoning involves systematic data gathering, 
data analysis and data synthesis. This process is conscious, 
rational, reliable and safe, but is time-consuming. This type 
of approach is exemplified in teaching institutions where 
medical residents dissect cases during morning report. This 
process should be also used in clinical practice when 
complicated situations are encountered. Despite having more 
safeguards within this process, the end product still can be 
wrong. In an analysis of 100 diagnostic errors in internal 
medicine, the most common reasons analytic reasoning went 
wrong was because of inadequate knowledge, inadequate 
data gathering or faulty data synthesis [13]. However, it is 
not always possible to use analytic reasoning in a busy 
clinical setting. It is difficult to imagine busy emergency 
room physicians approaching every patient in this analytic 
way. 
 There are also numerous system-related problems 
contributing to diagnostic errors. Among system-related 
factors, insufficient communication, insufficient care 
coordination, inadequate hand-offs, and, unavailability of 
experts and poor trainee supervision, are among the most 
frequent system issues contributing to diagnostic errors. The 
role of institutional safety culture cannot be overemphasized 
[8]. In the presented case, poor communication, insufficient 
care coordination and lack of ownership, resulted in an 
unfortunate, catastrophic event. Most diagnostic errors result 
from multiple interactions of cognitive and systems factors 
[7, 8]. 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPACT 
 It is well known that the majority of diagnostic errors go 
undetected. The initial focus should be on developing better 
systems for detection of diagnostic errors. Current systems 
for adverse event detection have flaws that make them 
unsuitable for diagnostic error detection. In a study by 
Griffin and Classen [14] both voluntary reporting systems 
and Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) missed 90 percent of 
adverse events. The Global Trigger Tool looks for triggers in 
a random sample of medical records, providing some 
indications of harm, but because of coding variations, 
identifying diagnostic errors by this method is insufficient. A 
common definition and unified reporting format for 
diagnostic errors is needed, similar to common formats for 
other safety events. Currently, the Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality (AHRQ) Common Formats allow 
healthcare providers to collect and submit standardized 
information regarding patient safety events but does not have 
a specific category for diagnostic error [15]. A centralized 
and anonymous self-reporting system with feedback 
mechanisms on a national level may be the best solution. 
 Some efforts have been made in recent years to develop 
methods for analyzing diagnostic errors in terms of root 
cause and severity of harm. In 2009, AHRQ sponsored 
research of diagnostic error through the Diagnostic Error 
Evaluation and Research (DEER) tool. In this study, authors 
developed and used the DEER taxonomy Chart Audit Tool 
to analyze diagnostic errors. Using this methodology, the 
authors found that 28% of reported diagnostic errors were 
rated as major: resulting in patient death, permanent 
disability, or a near-life-threatening event. The authors were 
also able to identify that most provider-related diagnostic 
errors occur during data synthesis [12]. 
POTENTIAL INTERVENTIONS STRATEGIES 
 While some diagnostic errors are unavoidable, harm from 
them should be decreased to the lowest possible level. To 
achieve this, broad-based strategies and interventions should 
be developed to address all potential domains and sources of 
diagnostic errors, not only addressing provider cognitive 
failure but also process breakdowns and broader system 
deficiencies which set up people for making medical and 
diagnostic errors. 
 There is little evidence about effective interventions at 
the patient level to reduce diagnostic errors. But, it is well 
known that patient and family active participation in the 
healthcare process can significantly contribute to patient 
safety [16]. It is fair to assume that patient active 
participation in the diagnostic process would be an 
opportunity to reduce diagnostic errors. For example, direct 
notification of patients with their mammography results has 
been implemented in many healthcare institutions as a 
backup system. This intervention could be potentially 
extended to other radiologic studies and pathology results. 
 Medical providers should be aware that diagnostic errors 
are part of practicing medicine. One of the crucial elements 
in the diagnostic process is medical knowledge. Once 
acquired, medical knowledge tends to decline over time. In 
order for medical knowledge to be maintained, frequent 
refresher courses, case analysis (especially for those cases 
where something went wrong), feedback, and simulation 
courses should be undertaken. 
 Cognitive psychology proponents advocate gaining 
insight into our thinking as a way to help avoid the most 
common cognitive traps and biases [16]. Physicians should 
be aware of their own cognitive processing and affective 
biases influencing their thought processes. Mindful self-
reflection activities, triggered by a situation at hand or a 
planned activity, improve diagnostic ability.
 
Simply being 
aware of one’s own possible cognitive biases might initiate 
an analytic mode of thinking. Cognitive de-biasing is an 
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important way of improving our performance and diagnostic 
reasoning. When dealing with a complex case, it is worth 
discussing the case with a colleague or asking for a second 
opinion. 
 Routine peer reviews of cases involving an unsatisfactory 
outcome should be standard practice, including feedback to 
the providers. Constructive feedback, in particular, is an 
important factor in improving diagnostic accuracy. Many 
physicians never learn about their wrong diagnoses, neither 
from patients nor from their colleagues. 
 Poorly designed work flows, processes, and policies 
provide fertile environments for diagnostic error. Clinical 
decision-making should be viewed as a process, starting with 
data gathering and physical examination, continuing with 
diagnostic testing and second opinions, and ending with 
subsequent follow-up and closure of the case. Multiple 
elements of the healthcare system are involved in this 
process. Many solutions are emerging for reducing system-
related diagnostic errors. Many such interventions are health 
information technology-based, such as those integrated with 
electronic health records (EHRs) [8].
 
Decision support 
systems are now on the market. However, there is currently 
not enough evidence that computerized diagnostic decision 
support systems improve diagnostic accuracy. Also, it is a 
challenge to build such systems into regular workflow. 
Checklists work well in certain clinical settings, but may not 
be always applicable [17]. Still, it is wise to adopt 
computerized decision support systems and check lists 
wherever applicable. 
TAKING THE NEXT STEPS 
 Culture shift: As with other patient safety issues, a 
positive safety culture in an organization generates positive 
attitudes towards patient safety. Potential mistakes in such 
organizations serve as a basis for learning, not for 
punishment or prosecution. Healthcare providers in 
organizations with positive safety culture feel valued, 
appreciated, and safe to report and discuss missteps in 
diagnostic process. 
 Communication: Better communication across the 
healthcare system should be an imperative. While this could 
be at least partly achieved through electronic medical 
records, nothing can replace person-to-person 
communication between providers and between providers 
and their patients. Patient families and caregivers can 
provide valuable information, especially when patients are 
unable to communicate for themselves. 
 Expert availability: Making experts available early in the 
diagnostic process would significantly improve early 
diagnostic accuracy. Expert directed work-up would also 
decrease costs for unnecessary testing. Experts may also 
shorten the period between diagnosis and appropriate 
treatment for better patient outcomes. 
 Teaching clinical decision-making: In teaching hospitals, 
there may be a tension between providing trainee supervision 
and ensuring patient safety. A supervising physician is 
required to strike a balance between vigilance to assure 
patient safety and adequate independence of the trainees in 
clinical decision-making. In addition, with current duty hour 
rules, admitting residents may not have sufficient 
opportunities to analyze cases or to learn that they have 
made incorrect diagnoses due to frequent hand-offs. In spite 
of these difficulties, incorporating education in diagnostic 
reasoning and patient safety in daily practice is paramount. 
Trainees should be encouraged to look for potential biases, 
system, or safety issues in each clinical encounter. Also, 
trainees should be encouraged to report and discuss 
diagnostic errors. So called “blind obedience,” where 
someone accepts a diagnosis because somebody higher in the 
hierarchy says so, should be abandoned. Critical thinking 
and respectfully challenging authority should be encouraged. 
 Adopting a proactive approach: Finally, we need to 
make the shift from a reactive approach to diagnostic errors 
(i.e. intervening when something has already happened) to a 
proactive one, where potential system problems are 
identified in a timely manner and addressed before 
diagnostic errors occur. 
CONCLUSION 
 Fortunately, in recent years, much work has been done in 
the field of diagnostic error. Many solutions are emerging for 
reducing system-related diagnostic errors. Still there is a lot 
of work ahead. Detection and reporting systems for 
diagnostic error need to be developed. A major culture shift 
is needed in order to stimulate voluntary diagnostic error 
reporting in a blame-free context and to relate diagnostic 
errors with the opportunity to learn, not to punish or 
prosecute. There has been progress in this area with the 
development of health information technology-based system 
interventions, checklists, and decision-support tools. As for 
providers, continuous improvement of medical knowledge is 
mandatory. When dealing with a complex case, it is worth 
discussing the case with a colleague or asking for a second 
opinion. Finally, having insight into one’s thinking and 
developing the skill of self reflection can improve one’s own 
diagnostic accuracy. 
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